The analysis presented in 1972 by R. F. Q. Johnson, B. A. Maher, and T. X. Barber indicated that nonhypnotic 5s manifest trance logic as often as "real" hypnotic 5s. E. R. Hilgard's 1972 critique contended that the analysis was misleading because only those 5s should have been included in the analysis who met the stringent criterion for hallucination. This paper shows that when one includes in the analysis only those 5s who met the stringent criterion for hallucination, again, nonhypnotic 5s manifest trance logic as often as real hypnotic 5s. Hilgard failed to reach this correct conclusion for several reasons, the main one being that he failed to include in his analysis all of the 5s who met his own criterion for inclusion. In the discussion, the disagreements are shown to derive from general problems in modern research on hypnotism.
dissertation and the paper that summarized his dissertation (Orne, 1959) concluded that trance logic is exhibited by almost all "real" hypnotic 5s, that is, highsuggestible 5s who have been exposed to a hypnotic induction procedure and who are judged to be in a hypnotic state, and by very few 5s who are asked to simulate hypnosis. Since Orne's conclusion was based on anecdotal data, I viewed it as a hypothesis that needed to be tested experimentally. My experiments did not confirm Orne's hypothesis; rather nonhypnotic 5s manifested trance logic as often as real hypnotic 5s. In the preceding article, however, Hilgard (1972) suggested that a different hypothesis that involves a different data analysis is more appropriate for testing the relationship between trance logic and hypnosis. Hilgard's hypothesis is that when only those 5s are included in the analysis who met the stringent criterion for hallucination, real hypnotic 5s manifest trance logic somewhat more often than nonhypnotic 5s. This hypothesis differs in at least two ways from the one I considered. First, it considers for analysis only those 5s from each group who passed the stringent criterion for hallucination 1 The author is indebted to B. A. Maher for serving as chairman of his dissertation committee, to T. X, Barber for advice and assistance in carrying out the experimental studies, and to both for critically reading and endorsing the contents of this manuscript.
2 Requests for reprints should be sent to R. F. Q. Johnson, who is now at IS Sahlin Circle, Franklin, Massachusetts 02038.
(even when it means excluding those real hypnotic 5s who passed all other suggestions). Second, it stresses that the relationship between trance logic and hypnosis is such that real hypnotic 5s simply exhibit trance logic somewhat more often than nonhypnotic 5s. Of course, Orne's original hypothesis was markedly different; Orne contended that almost all real hypnotic 5s and very few simulators show trance logic. After recasting the data and performing new statistical analyses, Hilgard concluded that the results were "largely indeterminate but with trends all in favor of Orne's original findings."
One point should be emphasized initially. Since Hilgard's reanalysis yielded only "trends,"
3 it is clear that Orne's original contention and the hypothesis that I testedthat trance logic is "almost invariably" found among the real hypnotic 5s and rarely found among the simulators-is invalid. The question now is, how much can we learn from each of these separate analyses of the same data when they are examined in the light of each other? At the end of this paper, I shall attempt to integrate the results of Hilgard's reanalysis with my original analysis, with Orne's original report, and with broader issues in modern research on hypnotism.
HILGARD'S REANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Hilgard's conclusions are misleading because his reanalysis of the data (a) does not consistently adhere to his own criterion for inclusion of 5s, (6) contains computational errors, and (c) fails to consider pertinent data. I shall discuss these three points in turn.
Failure to Adhere to the Criterion for Inclusion of Subjects
In order to test the new hypothesis that, when we consider only those 5s who meet the stringent criterion for hallucination, trance logic is somewhat more common in real hypnotic 5s than in nonhypnotic 5s, Hilgard clearly specified that only those 5s from each group who met the stringent criterion for hallucination are to be included in the analysis. It is, of course, perfectly legitimate to include in the analysis only those 5s who meet some criterion, provided that the criterion for inclusion is used consistently. However, Hilgard did not consistently adhere to his own criterion for inclusion of 5s. He excluded some of the nonhypnotic 5s (simulators or imagination controls), even though they met the criterion for inclusion in the analysis.
For example, let us consider Hilgard's Table B . This table includes only those 5s from each group who met Hilgard's criterion for inclusion, those who met the stringent criterion for hallucination. The Total X Treatment row in this table shows that 100% of the imagination controls, 50% of the hypnotic 5s, and 22% of the simulators showed trance logic (as indexed by the transparent hallucination). Thus, utilizing Hilgard's own criterion for inclusion of 5s, the imagination controls showed the highest percentage of trance logic. However, in his discussion of Table B , Hilgard discarded the one imagination control 5 even though this 5 met the stringent criterion for hallucination and also showed trance logic. Hilgard stated that the imagination control 5 was excluded from the discussion because one 5 is too small a number to be considered. However, Hilgard's criterion for inclusion of an 5 is that 5 meet the stringent criterion for hallucination and it is illegitimate to exclude any 5 who meets the criterion. Therefore, it is misleading when Hilgard states that the hypnotic 5s showed trance logic more often than the simulators; the appropriate conclusion is that 100% of the imagination controls, 50% of the hypnotic 5s, and 22% of the simulators displayed trance logic as indexed by the transparent hallucination.
In discussing his Table D , Hilgard excluded the two simulating 5s, who met his criterion for inclusion in this table, and referred only to the hypnotic 5s and the imagination controls. By excluding the two simulating 5s from the discussion, the impression was given that hypnotic 5s again showed more trance logic. If the simulators, who met Hilgard's own criterion for inclusion in Table D , had not been arbitrarily excluded from his discussion, the conclusion would have been that a larger percentage of simulators (100%) displayed trance logic than either the hypnotic 5s (85%) or the imagination controls (68%).
Similarly, when discussing his Table E, Hilgard excluded the two simulating 5s, even though they met his criterion for inclusion in this table. Again, if he had not arbitrarily excluded the simulating 5s, he would have concluded that simulating 5s showed more trance logic than either the hypnotic 5s or the imagination controls.
Since the data in Tables D and E are based  upon the liberal criterion for hallucination, I do not wish to give the impression here that I think the data in these tables are more important than Hilgard thinks they are. I do wish to emphasize, however, that even with respect to the data in these tables, Hilgard excluded 5s from his discussion that met his own criterion for inclusion and, consequently, drew misleading conclusions from the data.
Computational Errors
Since the data in Hilgard's Table C are based upon the stringent criterion for hallucination, it is an important table. Unfortunately, however, Table C contains two computational errors which lead to false conclusions. First, Table C shows that 2 of 4, or 50% of the high-suggestible nontrained hypnotic 5s who met the stringent criterion for hallucination, showed trance logic. These figures are incorrect since, according to Table A (which is correct), 6 5s in this group (Group 1) met the stringent criterion. The corrected figures are thus 2 of 6, or 33%. Second, the numbers for the hypnotic 5s in the Total X Treatment row are incorrect. The Table in correctly states that 1 + 2+1 = 5 and that 2 + 4 + 2 = 10. The corrected figures for the hypnotic 5s in the Total X Treatment row are 4 of 10, or 40%, instead of the miscomputed 5 of 10, or 50%. Both of these computational errors in Table C inflated the percentage of  hypnotic 5s showing trance logic as indexed by the double hallucination. When corrected, Hilgard's Table C shows that simulators and hypnotic 5s show about the same percentage of trance logic, 39% and 40%.
Failure to Discuss Pertinent Data
In discussing his analyses, Hilgard failed to mention what they show when one examines those 5s who most closely resemble those used by Orne. Orne compared high-suggestible trained hypnotic 5s with low-suggestible simulators. As seen in Hilgard's Table B , 0% of the high-suggestible trained hypnotic 5s (Group 1A) and 22% of the low-suggestible simulators (Group 4) showed trance logic as indicated by the transparent hallucination. Also, if one compares these same two groups of 5s in Table C , 50% of the high-suggestible trained hypnotic 5s and 44% of the lowsuggestible simulators showed trance logic as indexed by the double hallucination. In brief, with respect to the 5s who most closely resemble those used by Orne, Hilgard's reanalysis of the data utilizing the stringent criterion for hallucination (Tables B and C) shows one trend in favor of the low-suggestible simulators and another trend in favor of the high-suggestible trained hypnotic 5s.
INTEGRATION OF AVAILABLE DATA
Although Orne's (1957 Orne's ( , 1959 original anecdotal report suggested that trance logic may be a distinguishing characteristic of highsuggestible hypnotic 5s, all of the available experimental data indicate that this is not so.
The experiments that I carried out (Johnson, 1970; Johnson, Maher, & Barber, 1972) did not confirm the hypothesis that hypnotic 5s can be distinguished from simulating 5s on the basis of the relative frequency of occurrence of trance logic. Even in Phase II of my investigation, when "somnambulistic" hypnotic 5s were tested, the results remained the samehypnotic 5s were not characterized by trance logic.
When arithmetical mistakes are corrected and all 5s who met the stringent criterion for hallucination are included in the analysis, Hilgard's reanalysis also supports my original conclusion. Hilgard's reanalysis yielded some trends suggesting that trance logic is exhibited more often by real hypnotic 5s than by nonhypnotic 5s and other trends suggesting that trance logic is exhibited more often by nonhypnotic 5s than by real hypnotic 5s.
The findings that I originally reported (Johnson, 1970; Johnson, Maher, & Barber, 1972) have been confirmed by a study that has just been published (Blum & Graef, 1971 ). Blum and Graef compared excellent hypnotic 5s with low-suggestible simulators on the double hallucination index of trance logic. In line with my original findings, these investigators reported that the low-suggestible simulators showed trance logic as often as the excellent hypnotic 5s.
Thus, all of the available experimental data indicate that nonhypnotic 5s show trance logic as often as real hypnotic 5s and that trance logic cannot be considered as a distinguishing characteristic of hypnotic 5s.
TRANCE LOGIC RELATED TO GENERAL PROBLEMS IN RESEARCH ON HYPNOTISM
The complexities of research on trance logic derive from the many problems in present-day research on hypnotism. Research in this area is guided by two alternative paradigms (Chaves, 1968) . Hilgard and Ome are apparently guided by the "special state" paradigm which seems to postulate that (a) in highly suggestible 5s, hypnotic induction procedures give rise to a qualitative change in the organism-a special state or hypnotic trance state; and (b) this special state is instrumental in eliciting certain unusual behaviors such as catalepsy, muscular rigidities, anesthesia, age regression, hallucination, and amnesia. In an attempt to explain these behaviors, Orne and other investigators who adhere to the special state viewpoint have adopted a strategy of isolating and defining the essential characteristics of the hypothesized /hypnotic trance state. ' An alternative viewpoint guides other researchers such as Barber (1969 Barber ( , 1970a Barber ( , 1970b and Sarbin and Coe (in press ). The alternative viewpoint, as presented by Barber (1969) , includes the following postulates: (a) The phenomena to be explained are the overt behaviors and subjective reports traditionally associated with suggestions and with procedures labeled as hypnotic inductions, (b) The most proficient strategy available at present for explaining these so-called "hypnotic" behaviors, for example, catalepsy, anesthesia, age regression, hallucination, and amnesia, is to establish lawful relations between the ; behaviors and denotable antecedent and concurrent variables, (c) As antecedent-consequent relations are established, researchers ! should proceed to integrate the relations under a small number of general principles which utilize concepts that are closely tied to the data. Although workers such as Barber and Sarbin and Coe have related many hypnotic behaviors to denotable antecedent and concurrent variables, they have not as yet found it necessary to invoke a special state construct to integrate the observed relationships. An example of a "clash" between these two paradigms is found in Hilgard's critique when, in reference to Phase II of my investigation, he contends that since the simulators were high in suggestibility, there was a high risk that they would fall into a hypnotic state. Also, later, he implied that the imagination control S who met the stringent criterion for hallucination had spontaneously slipped into hypnosis. This type of argument leads to a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose situation and renders the special state theory untestable (Chaves, 1968; Spanos, 1970; Spanos & Chaves, 1970) . According to this kind of argument, simulators and control 5s must behave differently from hypnotized 5s because, if they behave in the same way as hypnotized 5s, they too must have entered a hypnotic state and, after the experiment is completed, can be transferred from the simulating or control group to the hypnotic group.
Two additional problems that underlie Hilgard's critique also stem from ambiguities in the special state paradigm. One of these; problems pertains to the concept of the real hypnotic S. Orne's contention was that real hypnotic 5s show trance logic whereas simulators do not. Who is to be considered as a real hypnotic 5? Is the person a real hypnotic 5 if he has previously shown that he is highly responsive to suggestions and then, when he is again exposed to a procedure labeled as a hypnotic induction, responds perfectly to almost all of the suggestions given? Or is a person a real hypnotic 5 if he is exposed to a hypnotic induction and then responds perfectly to all possible types of suggestions? If less than perfection is required to label an 5 as a real hypnotic 5, where should we draw the line? Should we draw the line at the point at which 5 meets the stringent criterion for hallucination (as Hilgard does) or should we choose some other criterion? Finally, when special state theorists contend that an imagination control 5 or a simulating 5 spontaneously entered a hypnotic state, do they view these 5s as real hypnotic 5s or as 5s who are in a hypnotic state but, for some reason, are not real hypnotic 5s ?
A second problem that seems to stem from ambiguities in the special state viewpoint pertains to the suggested visual hallucination. The special state theory seems to imply that there is a fundamental difference (that is more than semantic) in the following three types of reports that are proffered by 5s who have been given suggestions to hallucinate a person: "I see the person"; "I see the person in my mind's eye"; and "I vividly imagine the person." However, suggestions to see a person do not give rise to unique concomitants that differ from those produced by simply asking 5s to see the person in their mind's eye or to imagine the person vividly (Barber, 1969) . Rather, it appears that whether 5s report that they see the (suggested) person, or they see him in their mind's eye, or they vividly imagine him, depends on numerous antecedent variables including what questions they are asked, who conducts the interview, and whether honesty is demanded (Barber, Spanos, & Chaves, in press; Spanos & Barber, 1968) . Furthermore, it is unclear, from the special state viewpoint, what percentage of real hypnotic 5s are expected to show real visual hallucinations when such hallucinations are suggested. For example, in one part of his critique, Hilgard (1972) seems to be saying that the true figure is around 3% to 5% and in another part of his critique he seems to be saying that the true figure is around 10%. Then, when he criticizes my investigation for not including a sufficient number of real hallucinators, he seems to be saying that the true figure is markedly higher than 3% to 10%.
Ambiguities concerning who is to be considered as a real hypnotic S and who is to be considered as a real hallucinator appear to be at the root of the disagreement between Hilgard and myself. Since we see the problem from two separate paradigmatic points of view, it is predictable that we would differ in our opinions as to how to analyze the data. It is my contention that investigators who do not use a special state construct (Barber, 1969 (Barber, , 1970a (Barber, , 1970b Spanos & Chaves, 1970; Sarbin & Coe, in press) have presented cogent arguments and experimental data which indicate that these kinds of concepts-the real hypnotic S and the real suggested visual hallucination-are misleading and should be dropped from scientific discourse. From this vantage point, it would appear that it is incumbent upon special state theorists to remove the ambiguities from their concepts and to show how their concepts can be scientifically useful. 
